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Abstract 
Behavioral economists have come to recognize that reciprocity, the interaction of trust and 
trustworthiness, is a distinct and economically relevant component of individual preferences alongside 
selfishness and altruism. This recognition is principally due to observed decisions in experimental “trust 
games”. However, recent research has cast doubt on the explanatory power of trust as a determinant of 
those decisions, suggesting that altruism may explain much of what “looks like” trust. Moreover, 
empirical tests for alternative behavioral determinants can be sensitive to experimental bias due to 
differences in protocols and framing. Therefore, we propose discriminatory tests for altruism and trust 
that can be based on within-treatment and within-subject comparisons, and we control for group 
attributes of experimental subjects. Our results support trust (i.e. expected reciprocation) as the dominant 
motivation for “trust like” decisions. 
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VERIFIED TRUST:  RECIPROCITY, ALTRUISM, AND NOISE IN TRUST GAMES 
 
Trust, but verify. 
Russian proverb 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream economic theory is built squarely on the model of individuals as rational maximizers of own 
utility, with a rare subsidiary role conceded to altruistic concerns for “fairness” or equality. In an 
exciting recent development,  this basic theoretical building block has been refined to take account of 
observed behavioral regularities that depart from the pure homo oeconomicus paradigm. Even where 
theory had formerly allowed for non-selfish motivations, utility had been defined strictly over outcomes 
of individual actions. A strong argument has been made, however, that intentions matter too: kind deeds 
are reciprocated with kind deeds, and unkind deeds with unkind ones, even in pure one-shot situations. 
Such behavior cannot be traced back to pure individual self interest. Thus, reciprocity has come to be 
seen as a third major determinant of economic behavior, in addition to selfishness and altruism. 
 
Positive reciprocity, i.e. “reciprocal kindness”, is equivalent to the combination of trust and 
trustworthiness. We focus on the measurement of trust.1 Because of its value for relationships where 
formal contracting is costly, trust has been called a “lubricant” for the market economy (Arrow, 1974a), 
it has been shown to affect optimal contract and institutional design in a range of economic situations 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), and it has been found to favor the formation of 
large firms and organizations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), to promote 
                                                           
1
 A number of researchers have explored the determinants of trustworthiness (Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong and 
Magan, 2004; Clark and Sefton, 2000; Charness and Haruvy, 2002; Cox, 2003; Cox and Friedman, 2002; McCabe, 
Rigdon and Smith, 2003; Nelson, 2002). The main difference between laboratory analyses of trust and of 
trustworthiness is that the latter can draw on observed actions by trustors, while the former must incorporate 
expectations about trustees’ trustworthiness. 
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international investment and trade (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004) and to increase economic 
growth (Zack and Knack, 1999).  
 
This paper is about ways to distinguish trust empirically from other motivations. Much empirical 
analysis of trust has been based on survey answers to questions such as “generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted?”. This type of evidence is valuable for cross-cultural research (see 
e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), but there are inevitable limits to the accuracy and comparability of 
survey-based information (see, e.g., Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000). More rigorous 
empirical evidence in favor of trust and reciprocity has come from laboratory experiments. The “trust 
game” of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) has become a standard experiment to measure trust. In the 
trust game, a first mover is randomly and anonymously paired with a second mover, both are given a 
monetary endowment, the first mover may transfer some or all of his endowment to the second mover, 
this transfer is tripled by the experimenter and handed to the second mover, and finally the second 
mover may return some or all of the first mover’s transfer.2 First-mover transfers are interpreted as a 
manifestation of trust, and second-mover transfers as a manifestation of trustworthiness.3 
 
The interpretation of transfers in that game as manifestations uniquely of trust and trustworthiness has 
recently been questioned, because altruism might also play a role in non-zero (“trust-like”) transfers. A 
number of researchers have compared transfers in trust games to transfers in comparable dictator games 
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 The seminal trust-and-reciprocity experiment is the “gift-exchange game” of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). 
The main differences between the gift-exchange game and the trust game are, first, that the first-mover transfers in 
the gift-exchange game are determined through a bidding process (where above market-clearing transfers signal 
“kindness”), and, second, that, in the gift-exchange game, the positive-sum element appears at the level of second-
mover transfers (which are multiplied by the experimenter using a convex schedule). An interesting extension of 
the trust game has been put forward by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000). Their “moonlighting game” has the 
same structure as the trust game but allows for negative as well as positive reciprocity by the two players. 
3
 Conflicting results exist on the correspondence between responses to the typical attitudinal survey question on 
trust, and transfers made in trust games. In a sample of Harvard undergraduate students, Glaeser et al. (2000) 
observe no correlation between first-movers’ survey answers and their transfers made. Conversely, Fehr, 
Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp and Wagner (2003), in a design that mixes survey and experimental methods 
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and found the differences to be surprisingly small. Cox (2003), for example, finds that dictators sent 70 
percent of the amounts transferred by equally endowed trust-game players. 
 
We argue that the interpretation of trust-game transfers is complicated by a further factor, “noise”. This 
factor captures idiosyncrasies in individual preferences and, more importantly, potential biases induced 
by the framing and practical implementation of experiments. The mere fact that a game is based on a 
single choice (such as the dictator game) or on a sequence of choices (such as the trust game) may 
influence transfers, and difficult-to-control details of practical implementation can introduce treatment-
specific biases. This is particularly relevant in games with low stakes, where it may be rational for 
agents not to think through the full material payoff structure. 
 
Treatment-specific biases in the noise term are innocuous as long as comparisons are restricted to 
observations drawn from the same experimental treatment. Hence, we develop a discriminatory criterion 
that allows to test for the significance of altruism as a determinant of “trust-like” first-mover transfers 
within treatments. We do this by differentiating second movers by their experimental endowment and 
test whether first movers transfer more to “poor” second movers than to “rich” ones. In one of our 
experimental treatments, we furthermore adopt a within-subject design by letting each first mover play 
simultaneously with a poor and a rich second mover, so that we can control for potential individual-
specific biases as well as for treatment-specific bias. Using data gathered in three experimental sessions 
with undergraduate university students, we do not find a significant negative relationship between first-
mover transfers and second-mover “wealth” in any of our regression specifications or experimental 
treatments. Our results therefore reject the hypothesis of altruistic motives as statistically significant 
determinants of “trust-like” decisions. 
 
Another feature of our study is to use post-experimental questionnaires to refine the analysis of observed 
choices. Answers to a question on first movers’ expected returns allow us to test the original 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
for a broad cross-section of German residents, find that survey responses have strong predictive power for first-
mover trust-game transfers. 
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interpretation of observed trust-game decisions, that is whether “trust-like” transfers are indeed 
significantly affected by expected reciprocation. Even though questionnaire-based data on expectations 
are prone to measurement error, and estimated coefficients on those measured expectations are thus 
biased downwards, we find significantly positive coefficients when regressing first-mover transfers on 
expected second-mover returns. 4  These results confirm the hypothesis that “trust-like” behavior is 
indeed motivated by trust, i.e. the expectation of reciprocal kindness on the part of second movers. 
  
Finally, information gleaned from the questionnaires allows to test for group specific differences in 
trust-game transfers. We find that economics students are significantly less trusting than non-economics 
majors, but that gender, nationality, mother tongue and experimental treatment have no statistically 
significant impact on first-mover transfers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on laboratory-based measurement of 
trust. A behavioral model of first-mover motivations in trust games is developed in Section 3, and 
discriminating hypotheses on altruism and reciprocity are derived. The experimental protocol is 
described in Section 4. Section 5 reports our experimental findings and tests the two discriminating 
hypotheses econometrically. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. PLAYING GAMES WITH ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 The Starting Point: Behavior in Trust Games as a Manifestation of Reciprocity 
 
By their very definition, selfish and reciprocal motivations are compatible with perfect anonymity of the 
interacting individuals (Jencks, 1990; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). One can behave perfectly selfishly vis-à-
vis a total stranger, and one may reciprocate a friendly or unfriendly action even if nothing else is known 
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 Expected second-mover returns are expressed as shares of first-mover transfers in order to minimize potential 
simultaneity bias. 
 6 
about the individual concerned. In contrast, altruism is widely considered to be “context dependent” 
(Eckel and Grossman, 1996), i.e. it is negatively related to social distance (Jencks, 1990; Bohnet and 
Frey, 1999). 
 
In the double-blind one-shot trust game experiments, transfers made by first and second movers are 
incompatible with a society in which all agents behave purely selfishly and all agents expect all other 
agents to behave purely selfishly. Strict anonymity of experimental subjects is imposed in order to rule 
out altruistic motives or reputation effects, and to leave only reciprocity as a motivational force in 
addition to selfishness. In this view, first-mover transfers measure trust and second-mover transfers 
measure reciprocation. Agents in such games have consistently made significantly positive transfers in 
both directions. This has been interpreted as strong evidence for the pervasiveness of reciprocity as a 
motivator of social behavior, and it allows for interesting intercultural comparisons.5 In the United States, 
Berg et al. (1995) observed that first movers on average entrusted 51.6% of their endowment to second 
movers. Replicating that game in France and Germany, Willinger, Keser, Lohmann and Usunier (2003) 
found French students to be less trusting than Germans, the former transferring on average 42% of their 
endowment, compared to the 66% entrusted by the representative German subject. Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001) concluded that Israeli subjects considered Ashkenazic second movers more trustworthy 
than Sephardic second movers, since average first-mover transfers corresponded to 76% and 40% of 
first-movers’ endowments respectively. Bornhorst, Ichino, Schlag and Winter (2004), playing the game 
with PhD students, observed that northern Europeans trust more, and thus are trusted more, than 
southern Europeans. Finally, Fehr and List (2004) found that managers are more trusting than  university 
students: in their experiments (conducted in Costa Rica) CEOs sent 59% on average of their initial 
endowment, while students sent 40%. 
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 For a survey, see Camerer (2003, ch. 2.7). 
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2.2 The Challenge: Behavior in Trust Games as a Manifestation of Altruism 
 
In order to interpret non-zero transfers in standard trust games as measures of reciprocity, one has to 
assume that altruistic motives cannot exist in an anonymous setting. One could, however, argue that the 
standard design does not in fact grant perfect anonymity. Subjects, who are traditionally undergraduate 
university students, know that their counterparts are drawn from the same population. Students might 
perceive their social distance to other students, even if randomly chosen, to be small enough for them to 
qualify for altruistic treatment (as if they were all members of the “family of University X students”). 
Alternatively, they might feel what Jencks (1990) has termed “moralistic unselfishness”. This is a form 
of altruism that extends even to individuals with whom one has no direct contact, no prospect of direct 
contact and no particular emotional connection through some shared features (such as ethnicity, gender, 
age, etc.) except for the empathic feeling of being members of the same species. Such altruism is 
compatible with sharing some of the spoils of an experiment with an unknown fellow student.6 
 
The possibility that transfers in trust games may be motivated by a mixture of altruism and reciprocity 
has been recognized by Smith (2003). He reports on a three-node extended trust game, in which, at the 
initial decision node, the first mover has a choice between a conclusive payoff that is very favorable to 
the second mover (call it the “altruistic allocation”) and a continuation of the game to a node from where 
the ultimate outcome will increase in the degree of reciprocity between the two players but the second 
mover cannot reach a payoff as high as under the altruistic allocation. Strong altruism would advocate 
that the game ends at the initial node, with first movers choosing the allocation most favorable to second 
movers. None of Smith’s 26 experimental subjects makes this choice. This evidence rejects altruism as a 
dominant determinant of transfers in trust games. However, it cannot rule out altruism as part of the 
motivation underlying “trust-like” giving (altruism just is not strong enough for first movers to make the 
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 One might object that if students were prepared to make positive transfers in anonymous trust games because of 
altruistic motives, they should also be prepared to leave banknotes randomly on the campus. However, it is 
plausible to think that the opportunity cost in utility terms of sharing part of an experimental windfall when agents 
are explicitly offered that option is substantially lower than that of scattering earned money around the campus 
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sacrifice implied in the altruistic allocation). Moreover, opting for the altruistic allocation in this game is 
in fact incompatible with altruism defined as inequality aversion (see e.g. Fehr and Schmitt, 1999), since 
first-movers’ alternative option at the initial decision node gives them access to more equal allocations 
further down the decision tree. 
 
Another approach to test for altruism has been developed by Cox (2001, 2003, 2004). He proposes a 
“triadic” experiment where one group plays the standard trust game and two similarly sized control 
groups play dictator games. Members of the first group of dictators are given amounts that are equal to 
those allocated to first movers in the investment game. Hence, all dictators in that group are endowed 
with the same amounts. Dictators in the second control group are given amounts that are equal to those 
at the disposal of second movers in the trust game inclusive of the transfers received from first movers. 
Hence, dictators in the second group are not all endowed with the same amounts. 
 
Cox interprets transfers made by dictators as being motivated by altruism, which leads him to attribute 
the difference between transfers observed in the trust game and transfers observed by the respective 
control-group dictators as a measure of reciprocity. Running the experiment several times with 
University of Arizona students, he finds that control-group transfers amount to between 61 and 97 
percent of first-mover trust-game transfers. This would suggest that a major share of what has 
commonly been interpreted as trust-based transfers is in fact motivated by altruism. 
 
Similar evidence is found in several recent studies. Buchan, Croson and Dawes (2001) carry out (a) 
standard trust games, and (b) amended trust games in which second-mover transfers are not given to the 
first movers from which the second movers have received their transfers, but to a randomly chosen first 
mover. The amended trust game is effectively a two-way dictator game. They find that first-mover 
transfers in the amended game amount to 65 percent of transfers in the standard trust game. Dufwenberg 
and Gneezy (2000) compare dictator transfers to second-mover transfers made in an experiment that 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(where the evident alternative is to give money to some identified recipient). Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) finding 
that altruistic choices are price sensitive can be enlisted in support of this conjecture. 
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resembles the trust game, and they find no significant difference. McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) 
report results of an experiment that closely resembles the second-mover part of Cox’s triadic setup, the 
main difference being that they allow only two possible transfers - five or nothing. They observe that 
33% of second movers transfer five in the dictator-game treatment and 65% of second movers transfer 
five in the trust-game treatment. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) compare first-mover trust game transfers 
to dictator transfers in an experimental design that breaks the anonymity of subjects vis-à-vis the 
experimenter (because their aim is to study discrimination in Israeli society). From the mean transfers 
they report, one can calculate that dictator transfers correspond to up to 69% of first-mover transfers in 
the trust game. Finally, Charness (2004) reports on a gift-exchange game using the protocol of Fehr et al. 
(1993) but adding a control treatment where first-mover transfers (“wages”) are randomly created rather 
than offered by the first movers (“employers”). Charness (2004) finds that mean second-mover transfers 
(“effort”) are actually higher in the control treatment than in the standard gift-exchange treatment. 
 
The high average transfers by control-group dictators compared to trust-game subjects have led some 
experts to question the strength of the trust-reciprocity hypothesis. Surveying this literature, Camerer 
(2003, p. 100), for example, concludes that “repayments are mostly the result of altruism and are 
increased only a little by reciprocation”.  
 
 
2.3 A Further Complication: Noise 
 
In addition to trust and altruism, a realistic theory of experimental behavior must include randomness as 
a possible explanation for non-zero transfers by trust-game subjects. Even if subjects’ decisions in the 
laboratory happened to coincide on average with their hypothetical preferred choice under perfect 
information, sufficient stakes and neutral framing, observed decisions will have a random component 
and thus not reflect the hypothetical preferred choice in each case. Andreoni (1995b, p. 893) points out 
that “subjects [may] have somehow not grasped the true incentives”, and calls this effect “confusion”. 
Smith (2003, p. 494) considers the possibility that “subjects are game-theoretically unsophisticated”. 
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Not to grasp the incentives of the game fully could of course be a rational decision by experimental 
subjects who weigh up the intellectual effort of carefully considering their options against the potential 
returns. This view of costly information processing by experimental subjects is corroborated by the 
result, found across a number of different games, that raising the stakes, while mostly neutral on mean 
transfers, significantly reduces the variance of observed decisions (for a survey, see Camerer and 
Hogarth, 1999). 
 
In addition, it is well documented that experimental transfers are sensitive to the wording of instructions 
(Andreoni, 1995a; Bolton, Katok and Zwick, 1998; Burnham, McCabe and Smith, 2000; Charness, 
Frechette and Kagel, 2004; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996). Subtle differences in the language of 
instructions sheets can significantly change the amounts transferred. Their mere inexperience with the 
experimental situation can make subjects sensitive to small procedural features and thus bias the results, 
depending on which way the framing effects depart from perfect neutrality. Moreover, it may be that the 
very fact that subjects are given the option to make a transfer predisposes them towards thinking how 
much they should transfer, and not whether they should transfer at all. In that case, randomness takes the 
form of positive “experimental bias”. 
 
The implication of randomness is that individual transfers observed in trust and dictator games must be 
interpreted as noisy measures of trust and altruism. In particular, if experimental bias exists, it is no 
longer possible to determine the relative magnitude of reciprocity and altruism as motivational forces 
based on the differences between transfer levels of trust-game subjects and their peers in the dictator-
game control group. 
 
Cox (2001, 2003, 2004) and Buchan et al. (2001) take account of randomness by computing statistical 
significance tests on the difference in mean transfers between trust-game treatments and control 
treatments, and they find that trust-game transfers are statistically significantly higher. This supports the 
trust-reciprocity hypothesis. Since their experiments for different treatments were conducted 
sequentially, one might however argue that framing effects could have differed (the protocols differ, and 
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it just takes one wrong word by an experimenter) and/or that information could have flowed outside the 
laboratory among participants of different sessions.7 Note that different behavioral norms could be 
triggered by varying experimental protocols. For example, it may well be that subjects make some 
transfers for the mere reason that the option of making a transfer is given to them, or out of sheer 
curiosity about what will happen to them when the game has more than one decision node.8 For valid 
statistical inference, one would therefore wish to make within-session rather than between-session 
comparisons, with experimental protocols held as similar as possible, so that any experimental biases 
would affect treatment and control groups identically and thus wash out in the comparison. 
 
 
3. ALTRUISM VERSUS TRUST VERSUS NOISE: 
DERIVATION OF DISCRIMINATING HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 First-Mover Transfers in Trust Games: A Behavioral Model 
 
In a quest for analytical rigor and transparency of underlying assumptions, we propose a model of 
subject motivations in trust games. The model is kept as parsimonious as possible while incorporating 
the key behavioral elements put forward in the literature. 
 
The trust game can be formally described as follows. First movers i start the game with a money holding 
of yi. Second movers j have an initial money holding of yj. At the first stage of the game, first movers 
can send any amount si, 0  si  yi, to their paired second movers.9 The experimenter triples the amount 
sent, so that second movers receive 3si. At the second stage of the game, second movers can return any 
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 Cox (2004, p. 270) gives a description of the framing issue, raised by a referee: “The argument was that, while 
the games in the three treatments may look similar using the author’s [i.e. Cox’s] theoretical framework, we do not 
know how subjects think about them. It was argued that treatments A, B, and C may elicit different fairness norms, 
leading to the use of different rules of thumb.” 
8
 This is particularly relevant for the “triadic” game, since curiosity about later stages may play a role in the trust 
game but not in the dictator game. 
9
 We abstract here from the fact that amounts sent in experiments must take discrete values. 
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amount rj, 0  rj  (yj + 3si), to their paired first movers. We call “rate of return” the ratio ijj sr / ; 
and we denote holdings at the end of the game by Yi and Yj, for first and second movers respectively. 
Hence, Yi = yi - si + rj = yi + si(j - 1), and  Yj = yj + 3si - rj = yj + si(3 - j). Finally, players’ beliefs about 
actions of others are denoted with a circumflex. Thus, we write first movers’ expected rate of return 
from second movers as jˆ . 
 
 
A General Utility Function 
 
We specify the following general expected utility function of an agent in a two-player sequential game 
that is restricted to strictly non-negative transfers: 
 
 Ui = E( f(Yi, Yj, [i, Kj], Aii)),        (1a) 
 
where f is continuous and twice differentiable in its four arguments, K represents “kindness” (to be 
defined below), A stands for the agent’s own action, and  is a mean-zero stochastic term. Furthermore, 
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Assumptions (1b) represent standard concave preferences over own income with nonincreasing absolute 
risk aversion. Assumptions (1c) define altruism, incorporating an element of inequality aversion: my 
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utility gain from a given increase in your payoff is larger if this makes you less poor than I than if this 
makes you even richer than I. 10  Assumption (1d) represents “intrinsic reciprocity” (Sobel, 2004): 
irrespective of final outcomes, agents’ utility increases if they feel treated kindly and if they can 
reciprocate kindly (vice-versa for unkind actions). Note that trusting behavior could either be motivated 
entirely by intrinsic reciprocity (a “desire to elicit kindness through kindness”), or by a combination of 
own-payoff maximization (selfishness) and expected intrinsic reciprocity on the part of the other agent. 
Finally, (1e) expresses that agents’ utility may be affected by idiosyncratic factors, which we attribute to 
experimental error. 
 
In order to apply the general utility function (1a) to an analysis of first-mover transfers in a laboratory 
trust game, two issues require us to impose further structure. 
 
First, the first two arguments of utility function (1a-e) are defined over end-node outcomes. Hence, we 
need to model first-movers’ beliefs about second-movers’ reactions. We make two simplifying 
assumptions: 
 (1f): First movers reason about second-movers’ returns in terms of rates of return. Specifically, 
they hold beliefs about the expected rate of return ( jˆ ) and the variance thereof, both of which 
are independent of the amount sent (si). 
 (1g): In so far as their altruistic motive is concerned, first movers abstract from possible second-
mover strategies. Hence, altruism, if present, is guided solely by payoffs at the first decision 
node, yj + 3si and yi - si.11 
These assumptions, while intuitively rather plausible, are not innocuous. They imply bounded rationality 
and allow us to abstract from higher-order conjectures by first movers. 
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 Our specification encompasses the possibility that, if you are richer than I, an increase in your payoff reduces my 
utility. 
11
 This assumption could represent bounded rationality on the part of first movers who look at initial relative 
payoffs as a sufficient approximation of end-node relative payoffs. 
 14 
Second, in order to quantify kindness, we need to define a benchmark action that represents zero 
kindness. 
 (1h): For first movers, the no-kindness benchmark is at si = 0, the subgame perfect strategy of 
purely selfish agents. For second movers, the benchmark is 1  j , above which any return 
implies kindness. 
Hence, kindness implies a positive first-mover transfer (as it exposes first movers to the risk of losing 
out at the expense of second movers) and a second-mover transfer that returns more than what first 
movers sent (as it rewards first movers with a positive return for their risky strategy that has benefited 
second movers). 
 
Finally, in view of later empirical application, we narrow down the preference model further, by 
imposing the following two assumptions: 
 (1i): f is additive in its arguments. 
 (1j): i is a random variable drawn independently from the same distribution for every agent i. 
The distribution of i is normal around a mean X ( i ~ N(X,  2)), and it is uncorrelated with yj 
and jˆ . 
We allow for a potentially non-zero mean of the idiosyncratic term in (1j) because confusion and 
framing effects may bias si upward.12 
 
 
Utility Function of Laboratory “Trustors” 
 
Based on (1a-j), we can write the following utility function of first movers at the first decision node of 
the standard laboratory trust game: 
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 Strictly speaking, our model therefore implies that E( i) > 0; but for the analysis that follows it suffices to 
impose the weaker restriction E( i)  
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Ui = a*E(fselfish( ]1  ˆ[   jii sy  )) + b*(faltruist( yj +3 si, yi – si)) + c*E(  iji ss ˆ ) + isi, 
 (2) 

  
> jˆ .  
 
Assumptions (1b-e) carry over to the four arguments of (2). Hence, (1b) and (1c) define the admissible 
functional forms for fselfish and faltruist. The specific functional form that we impose on the third argument 
of (2) ensures that first movers, to the extent that they are motivated by intrinsic reciprocity, will transfer 
more (i.e. be kinder) the more they expect second movers to return (i.e. the more kindly they expect 
second movers to react), conforming with assumptions (1d) and (1h). The first and third arguments of (2) 
are written in terms of expected utility, since jˆ  is a random variable from the point of view of first 
movers. 
 
 
3.2 Two Discriminating Hypotheses 
 
We have identified four determinants of first-mover transfers in the trust game, but we only observe one 
variable si. The challenge is to design the experiment such that separate determinants of si become 
identifiable. 
 
Our first approach is to vary second movers’ initial wealth yj, and to examine the relationship between si 
and yj. (2), (1c) and (1f) imply that: 
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If altruism features, first movers will give more to poor second movers than to rich ones. Conversely, 
according to (3b), first-mover transfers in the absence of own altruistic motives will be unrelated to 
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second-mover wealth.13 (3b) represents the behavioral model implicit in the original interpretation of 
trust-game results. Expressions (3) thus provide a crisp discriminating hypothesis. 
 
Proposition 1: 
Altruism implies that first movers send more to poor second movers than to rich second movers. In the 
absence of altruism, first-mover transfers are unrelated to second-mover wealth. 
 
Proposition 1 has the advantage of being based entirely on directly observable variables. Its drawback is 
that it is not an explicit test of the relevance of trust as a motivating force underlying first-mover 
transfers. If we are prepared to extend the analysis to expected reciprocation jˆ , a variable that cannot 
be observed directly, we can postulate the following: 
 
 0
ˆ



j
is

,      iff     a = 0,   c = 0,  and       (4a) 
 0
ˆ



j
is

 otherwise.        (4b) 
 
Hence, we can formulate a second discriminatory proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: 
Trust implies that first-mover transfers increase in expected second-mover returns. In the absence of 
trust, first-mover transfers are unrelated to expected second-mover returns. 
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 Note that we have not determined how first-movers’ expectation jˆ  is formed, hence implying that it is based 
on a universally shared heuristic norm. If we allowed for more fully rational expectation formation, jˆ  might 
plausibly correlate positively with yj, as richer second movers with concave utility over own payoff would be 
“better able to afford” reciprocation, and their altruistic motive too would favor more generous reciprocation. In 
that case, the first derivative in (3b) would be positive. Furthermore, the qualitative result that si increases in yj 
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As (4a) shows, trust has two components: intrinsic reciprocity and selfish own-payoff maximization. 
With intrinsic reciprocity taking the form stipulated in (2), it is easy to derive that si increases in jˆ : the 
kinder I expect you to be, the more kindly I feel like treating you. If first movers hold no intrinsically 
reciprocal preferences but expect second movers to hold them, their selfish motive will still motivate 
first-movers to make transfers. This situation in fact corresponds to the textbook asset allocation 
problem of a risk-averse agent choosing between a safe asset (keep the money) and a risky asset (make a 
transfer to the second player). As shown by Arrow (1974b, p. 105), concave utility over own payoff with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, as assumed in (1b), implies that first movers’ demand for the risky 
asset (si) will be positively correlated with additive shifts in the expected return ( jˆ ). 
 
 
3.3 Testing for Altruism 
 
We can now specify the following baseline model for estimation of Proposition 1: 
 
 si = C +  yj + e0i,  e0i = i - E( i),       e0i ~ N(0,  2),      C = E( i) + ,  (5) 
 
where C,  and e0i are unobserved.  stands for transfers motivated by trust. If we use OLS, assumption 
(1j), combined with the normality of the distribution of e0i, implies that we will obtain unbiased 
estimates of C,  and e0i, and that standard inference can be applied. Note that C is a biased estimate of 
, which is why the comparison of mean transfers in the triadic experiment is problematic. 
 
Our discriminating criterion can be evaluated through a t test on the null hypothesis that OLS = 0. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, and OLS is negative, then we infer that altruism plays a significant role in 
determining si. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then we conclude that, relative to the noise in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
would hold even if altruism were linear, i.e. if the last derivative in (3a) were equal to zero. In that case, si would 
be bigger if yj < yi than if yj > yi but constant for variations of yj in each of those ranges. 
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our data, altruism is not a significant determinant of si, and si thus represents a combination of trust and 
experimental error. Finally, if the null hypothesis is rejected and OLS is positive, our model is rejected 
by the data.14 
 
We consider three extensions to this baseline empirical model. First, we allow some variation in agents’ 
trust motives. Specifically, we now maintain that  and/or E( i) can differ across population groups. 
These groups can be characterized by criteria such as gender, nationality, educational background or 
date of the experiment. This extension allows for the possibility that, despite our randomized 
experimental design, yj happens to be correlated with some grouping that affects si, in which case the 
baseline estimate of  would be biased.15 
 
Suppose, for example, we consider only a single criterion, gender, represented by a dummy variable Gi, 
set to 1 for women. Our empirical model thus becomes: 
 
 si = C + Gi +  yj + e1i.         (6) 
 
Adding additional grouping criteria would simply add further intercept-shifting parameters  to the 
model. 
 
Second, we also allow some variation in agents’ altruistic motives, since the altruism motive could be 
significant for some groups and not for others. Using again the example of grouping by gender, the 
model becomes: 
 
 si = C + Gi + 0 yj + 1Gi yj + e2i,       (7) 
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 An extension of the model along the lines sketched in footnote 10 could accommodate a positive coefficient. 
15
 This is possible only in the between-subjects version of our experiment. 
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where 1 captures the differential effect on altruism-induced transfers of female compared to male 
players.16 
 
Third, we take account of the fact that the trust game imposes bounds on the dependent variable si. To 
correct for potential bias arising through this double censoring, we use a two-limit Tobit estimator, with 
censuring points corresponding to the experiment-specific lower and upper bounds on si. 
 
 
3.4 Testing for Reciprocity 
 
Our empirical test developed above pits a null hypothesis of altruism against the alternative of no 
altruism. Based on Proposition 2, we can formulate a complementary test, still concerning si but setting 
up a null hypothesis of trust-reciprocity versus an alternative of no such motivation. The reciprocity-
augmented version of the group-wise model (7) becomes: 
 
 si = C +  jˆ  + Gi + 0 yj + 1Gi yj + e3i,      (8) 
 
where C,  and  are the same as in (7). A test for reciprocity simply means comparing the null 
hypothesis  = 0 with the alternative  > 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
implies significance of the trust-reciprocity motive. If both the null and the alternative hypotheses are 
rejected, i.e. OLS < 0, our model is rejected by the data. 
 
Why do we not incorporate jˆ  in our regression specification from the start? The reason is that jˆ  is 
neither a design feature of the experiment (like yj) nor an observable strategy chosen by subjects (like si), 
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 When, as in our example, there is only one grouping variable, then separate regressions for the each group would 
be equivalent to estimating equation (8). When we control for multiple overlapping groupings, however, the 
interaction specification à la equation (8) is different from, and superior to, group-wise regressions. 
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as it can only be observed by asking subjects.17 Model (8) therefore mixes experimental with survey 
methods. Given that the former has been developed as a way to reduce the informational imprecision 
typically associated with the latter, moving from (7) to (8) implies the concession of some observational 
accuracy. jˆ  being measured with error, the OLS and its associated standard error will be 
unambiguously downward biased (see e.g. Meijer and Wansbeek, 2000). Since we have no perfect 
palliative for this problem, our test for reciprocity is biased in favor of acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of no reciprocity. The odds of our test are thus stacked against diagnosing trust. 
 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
 
We have played the trust game with undergraduate students at the University of Lausanne. First movers 
were all endowed with yi = 10 Swiss francs.18 Second movers were differentiated by the size of their 
show-up fee yj, some starting the experiment with nothing, some with 10 francs and some with 20 francs. 
First movers knew the size of yj of their paired second movers, and second movers knew their paired 
first movers’ endowment yi.  
 
We played this game in three sessions, using standard double-blind procedures. No subject had 
participated in an experiment before, none played more than once, and they were allocated randomly to 
first- or second-mover roles. Subjects were recruited by email sent to all University of Lausanne first-
year undergraduate students.19  
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 Note that jˆ  and yj are uncorrelated in our behavioral model, which leaves OLS of regression equations (6) to (8) 
unbiased even though jˆ  is omitted from the estimations. In the empirical part, we explicitly test for omitted-
variables bias (and can reject it in all cases). 
18
 At the time of the experiments, one Swiss franc was worth approximately 0.73 US dollars. 
19
 The texts of the “recruitment email”, experimental instruction sheets and the post-experiment questionnaire can 
be obtained from the authors on request. 
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 Session A was played manually with physical money (coins of 1 franc) on January 20, 2003. 38 
first movers played with one second mover each. 13 second movers started the game with 
nothing, 12 started with 10 francs and 13 started with 20 francs. 
 Session B was played manually with physical money (coins of 1 franc) on January 22, 2003. 18 
first movers played with two different second movers each, one with no show-up fee, and one 
with a show-up fee of 20 francs. 
 Session C was played via internet during the first week of June 2003. 31 first movers played 
with one second mover each. 16 second movers started the game with nothing, and 15 started 
with 20 francs. 
 
For sessions A and B, we used standard manual procedures, with first movers, second movers and 
experimenters in separate rooms and money circulating physically in sealed envelopes. Before leaving 
the venue of the experiments, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire which did not compromise 
their anonymity.20 
 
Session C was conducted using a novel web- and email-based protocol managed by an independent 
monitor so as to respect anonymity among players and vis-à-vis the experimenter. Subjects were 
recruited via email and retained if they had not previously taken part in session A or B. First movers 
were randomly selected and invited by email to go to a web page with the relevant instructions. They 
were attributed an individual code allowing the monitor to match transfers. The second stage started two 
days later, once all first movers had made their decisions. Second movers were then invited to connect to 
a web page with their instructions. There, they also learned their initial endowment (0 or 20 francs) and 
the amount that had been sent by their paired first movers and tripled by the monitor. Second movers 
were asked to make their return decisions and to fill out the post-experiment questionnaire on the web 
page. Once second movers had made their decisions, an email was automatically sent to their paired first 
movers. First movers were than asked to fill out a post-experiment questionnaire. Finally, all players 
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 Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000), comparing treatments with and without questionnaires, report that the 
introduction of anonymity-preserving questionnaires in trust games has no significant impact on transfers made.  
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were invited to collect their earnings from an administrative clerk. Players had no way of finding out 
each other’s identity, since they exchanged mails only with the monitor. The experimenters were also 
kept uninformed about the identity of the players. 
 
The manual sessions required about two hours, whereas the computerized session took five days, due to 
the sequential and decentralized experimental setup. Descriptive statistics on the composition of the 
subject pools and on transfers made are given in Table 1. 
 
We chose to conduct the experiment in three different settings as a robustness check of our inference 
with respect to the experimental protocol used. This allows us to compute between-treatment differences 
as well as within-treatment differences, i.e. we can compare transfers made by different subjects in 
exactly the same experimental setting and with identical instructions. We can thereby eliminate the 
potential bias that exists when observed transfers are compared across different sessions and/or 
protocols. In Session B, using a within-subject design, we control not just for possible treatment-specific 
experimental biases, but for subject-specific biases. We thus expect Session B results to be particularly 
statistically powerful.21 
 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Summary statistics of observed transfers are reported in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1. We find that 
both first movers and second movers made large transfers in all three sessions. First movers on average 
sent 7.02 of their 10 francs to second movers, and second movers on average returned 10.32 francs. As a 
point of comparison, two trust games played with US students and both yi and yj of 10 dollars yielded 
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 Camerer (2003, p. 42) notes that “there is a curious bias against within-subjects designs in experimental 
economics”, and that “one possible reason is that exposing subjects to multiple conditions heightens their 
sensitivity to the differences in conditions. This hypothesis can be tested (...) by comparing results from within- 
and between subjects designs, which is rarely done.” Since heightening first movers’ sensitivity to yj is precisely 
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averages sent (returned) of 5.16 (4.66) dollars (Berg et al., 1995) and 5.97 (4.94) dollars (Cox, 2003). 
Furthermore, our experiments confirm the finding that only a small fraction of players conform to the 
subgame perfect equilibrium with pure selfishness by giving nothing (10 percent of first movers and 22 
percent of second movers across the three sessions). In line with most of the existing comparable 
experimental evidence, our results therefore appear incompatible with universal selfishness as the sole, 
or even dominant, motivation in trust-game settings.22 
 
 
5.1 Is It Altruism? 
 
First, we estimate equation (5), a simple regression of si on yj. The results are given in column (I) of 
Table 2. We find a coefficient on yj of 0.02 which has the “wrong” sign and is statistically insignificant. 
Virtually the same result obtains when we restrict the estimation to the “within” design of Session B and 
we control for subject-specific fixed effects (column (II)): yj does not significantly affect si even in this 
most propitious of experimental designs. The null hypothesis of no altruism cannot therefore be rejected. 
 
Next, we estimate a multi-group version of equation (6) by controlling for group-specific attributes that 
might affect mean transfers.23 We consider five attributes: gender (Female = 1 for women), nationality 
(Nat_Swiss = 1 for Swiss nationals or permanent residents), native tongue (Lang_French = 1 for French 
speakers, Lang_German = 1 for German speakers), subject of study (Non-economist = 1 for non-
economics/business students) and experimental session (Session_B = 1 for Session B; Session_C = 1 for 
Session C). Table 1 reports summary statistics on the distribution of those attributes in our subject 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
what we aim for, this design appears particularly attractive to our purpose, and we compare results of within- and 
between-subjects protocols. 
22
 Our somewhat guarded use of language here is due to the fact that, in principle, non-zero transfer levels could be 
due to experimental bias. 
23
 Note that the RESET test for model (I) in Table 2 indicates no misspecification problem. Hence, our 
parsimonious model, although almost devoid of explanatory power, does not appear fraught with estimation bias 
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sample. Estimation results are given in column (III) of Table 2. The coefficient on yj is substantially 
unaffected, and the altruism hypothesis is therefore again not supported. Gender, nationality and mother 
tongue have no statistically significant impact on first-mover transfers either.24 We find, however, that 
non-economics students send significantly more than economics and business majors.25 There is also a 
borderline-significant effect of experimental Session B - a finding which highlights the potential biases 
affecting between-treatment comparisons. 
 
In a third step, we extend the multi-group specification to allow also for different altruism according to 
group attributes, by adding interaction effects as in equation (7). The last column of Table 2 reports our 
estimations. We now find that the coefficient on yj has the “correct” negative sign, but it continues to be 
statistically insignificant. More importantly, we find none of the interaction effects to be statistically 
significant. It is particularly revealing that not even the interaction term for Session B (Session_B × yj) is 
significant, recalling that in that session a within-subject protocol was adopted and any impact of yj on si 
could be expected to be particularly strong there. Furthermore, F tests on the joint significance of 
interactions with all group attributes or subsets thereof all fail to reject the null hypothesis that  the 
coefficients are jointly zero.  
 
To account for the two-sided censoring of si implied by the trust game, we re-estimated the four 
equations using the two-sided Tobit estimator (Table 3). The results are qualitatively unchanged from 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
due to omitted variables. That is of course not surprising, given that the randomized design of the experiment 
should make yj, the sole regressor of model (I), uncorrelated with any player characteristics. 
24
 Our results mirror those of Glaeser et al. (2000), who found that a range of similar control variables in a subject 
pool consisting of undergraduate students did not significantly affect si. This need not mean, however, that there 
are no group-specific differences in reciprocity or altruism. Playing dictator games with varying payoff structures, 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), for example, observed that “demand curves for altruism” of men and women are 
different but cross at a certain “price of giving”. One possible explanation for insignificant group effects could 
therefore be that the reward structure of our experiment is such that it places members of different groups close to 
those crossing points. 
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the OLS runs. The coefficient on yj is never significant, in terms of both main effects and interaction 
terms. 
 
In sum, our results suggest that altruism is not a statistically significant motivating force in determining 
“trust-like” behavior, both across all subjects and for specific groups of players. 
 
 
5.2 Is It Reciprocity? 
 
Table 4 reports regression estimates based on equation (8), in univariate form (column (I)) and with 
group-specific controls (column (II)). The univariate model yields an (implausibly) negative coefficient, 
but the borderline-significant P value on the RESET tests suggests misspecification bias. When we 
include controls for subject attributes and experimental treatments, the coefficient on jˆ  turns positive, 
as expected, but remains statistically insignificant. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that a first 
mover who expects the second mover to return 1.5 times si, earning him a 50% “profit”, sends only 0.08 
francs more than a first mover who expects the second mover merely to return si, which would leave him 
with no gain. 
 
As discussed above, this analysis is biased against detecting trust, due to the fact that jˆ  is observed 
through questionnaire answers and thus likely measured with error. One particular issue with our 
protocol is that we asked first movers their jˆ  after they had observed j . This sequencing was 
motivated by the practical expediency of handing out questionnaires at the end of the game in manual 
sessions, but it implies a risk of biased ex post reporting. Figure 2 plots observed returns against first-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
25
 This result also conforms to prior findings. In an overview of relevant empirical studies, Frank, Gilovich and 
Regan (1993, p. 170) conclude that there is “a large difference in the extent to which economists and 
noneconomists behave self-interestedly”, and that “economists are more likely than others to free-ride”. 
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movers’ stated expectations. The scatter does not suggest strong positive correlation, and the sample 
correlation coefficient equals 0.33. Observation bias thus does not appear to be strong. 
 
We can limit one distorting impact of mismeasurement by dropping observations for which inaccurate 
reporting appears particularly probable. In a first step, we drop all observations with jˆ  bigger than 3, 
which would suggest that first movers would have expected second movers to return more than the total 
transfer of 3si received and is thus incompatible with our assumed preference structure as well as with 
any other behavioral theory. Dropping the four observations concerned has no qualitative impact on 
control variables but changes the result on jˆ  dramatically (Table 4, columns (III) and (IV)). The 
estimated coefficient is now statistically significantly positive, which suggests that expected 
reciprocation is a significant determinant of first-mover transfers. We also find that the quantitative 
impact of expected reciprocity increases more than five-fold when we drop the four highly implausible 
observations, from 0.17 (column (II)) to 0.94 (column (IV)). 
 
As another check on our results, we drop all observations with reported jˆ  exceeding 2. A jˆ  larger 
than 2 implies that second movers are expected to return more than two thirds of the tripled transfer, 
which would necessitate strong expected altruism on the part of the second mover. Given our lack of 
evidence of altruism in first-mover behavior, it seems implausible for first movers to expect strong 
altruism on the part of their paired second movers.  The results, given in columns (V) and (VI) of Table 
4, again suggest that expected second-mover returns significantly increase first-mover transfers. The 
estimated coefficient of the last specification suggests that a first mover who expects the second mover 
to return 1.5 times si, earning her a 50% “profit”, sends 0.59 francs more than a first mover who expects 
the second mover merely to return si. Given the attenuation bias in our estimation, this must be 
considered as a lower-bound estimate. 
 
We also estimated the model with jˆ  with the full set of interactions (analogously to equation (7)). 
None of the interaction terms was found to be statistically significant. This implies that there are neither 
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group-specific differences in reciprocity-motivated transfers, nor does the reciprocity motive appear 
with different strength in the within-subjects treatment compared to the between-subjects treatments. 
The latter result is of course not surprising, as our model does not predict that reciprocity-based trust 
should be affected by yj. 26 
 
In sum, our results suggest that trust is a statistically significant motivating force in determining “trust-
like” behavior. Trust-based first-mover giving seems to be based on a generally shared norm that does 
not differ significantly across subject groups. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We propose discriminatory criteria to identify altruism and reciprocity as determinants of first-mover 
transfers in trust games. The tests are based on within-treatment and, in one experimental session, on 
within-subject comparisons. They should therefore be immune to the experimental bias problem 
associated with the random component in the choices of laboratory subjects. Post-experimental 
questionnaires furthermore allow us to control for potential group-specific effects on trust-game 
transfers. Inference on our results, based on experiments using randomized double-blind protocols and 
conducted with University of Lausanne undergraduate students, reject altruism but accept expected 
reciprocity as explanations for “trust-like” transfers. 
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 We have experimented with more refined selection criteria, by setting differentiated plausibility thresholds for 
reported jˆ  according to second-mover endowments yj (with maximum plausible jˆ  increasing in yj), but the 
results remained qualitatively unchanged. In addition, we estimated the model using common methods for dealing 
with mismeasured regressors, including bootstrap estimation, inverse least squares and the method of grouping. All 
these approaches confirmed the statistically significantly positive coefficients on jˆ . We also reestimated the 
model (i) using the Tobit estimator and (ii) considering only the “within” variation of Session B, but we found the 
results qualitatively unchanged. Finally, to take account of non-normal disturbances, we estimated all models using 
the LAD estimator and bootstrap confidence intervals. Again, the results were not substantially changed. All these 
results are available from the authors on request. 
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Our findings lend support to the view that social preferences in extensive non-repeated games are not 
separable: perceived kindness and intentions matter. Related studies have come to similar conclusions, 
but from the point of view of second movers, i.e. from agents who base their choices on their 
interpretation of the “kindness” implied in first movers’ observed decisions (Clark and Sefton, 2000; 
Charness and Haruvy, 2002; Cox, 2003; McCabe et al. 2003; Nelson, 2002). We confirm that first 
movers’ choices are significantly determined by the anticipation of reciprocal behavior on the part of 
second movers: what looks like trust, seems to be trust. Trust games therefore do seem to be a valid 
method to fill the “great lacuna in this research agenda [that is] the measurement of trust” (Glaeser et al., 
2000, p. 811). 
 
Notwithstanding this positive result, a cautionary note is also in order. We have insisted on the simple 
point that “noise” should be taken into account when interpreting experimental results. The whole 
experimental approach to economics strives to eliminate as much as possible any non-controlled 
influences. The “as much as possible” qualifier is important: when even physicists cannot create 100% 
controlled laboratory conditions, economists must be realistic about their ability to eliminate unintended 
influences on subject behavior. This does not undermine the validity of economic experiments, but it 
calls for carefully designed hypothesis tests. 
 
This research could be extended in a number of ways. It would be interesting for our experiment to be 
replicated with different subject pools, since, as pointed out e.g. by Fehr et al. (2003), one type of 
experimental bias could arise through the non-representativeness of self-selected student samples. The 
only way to correct for bias of this type is to make subject pools more representative. Another 
potentially worthwhile modification would be to use higher monetary stakes, to test whether our 
rejection of the altruism hypothesis is robust to a compression of the variance of the disturbance term.  
Finally, our model implies common altruism and reciprocity preferences across subjects of a particular 
type, and attributes any individual idiosyncrasy to the noise term. The within-subject experimental 
approach might be extended in a way to allow estimation of a model that accommodates individual-
specific tastes for altruism and reciprocity. 
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Table 1:   Data Description 
 
 Session A Session B Session C TOTAL 
No. of observations 38 36# 31 105 
si 
##
 7.76 (2.63) 6.44 (3.49) 6.77 (4.31) 7.02 (3.50) 
rj
 ##
  12.37 (10.93) 8.06 (8.19) 10.45 (13.93) 10.32 (11.15) 
yi ## 10 (0) 10 (0) 10 (0) 10 (0) 
jˆ
##
 
2.00 (1.12) 1.86 (0.95) 1.32 (0.82) 1.78 (1.01) 
 
yj
 ###¶
 
13 * 0 
12 * 10 
13 *20 
18 * 0 
18 * 20 
16 * 0 
15 * 20 
47 * 0 
12 * 10 
46 * 20 
Female 18.4% 38.9% 19.4% 25.7% 
Nat_Swiss 92.1% 83.3% 83.9% 86.7% 
Lang_French 81.6% 77.8% 77.4% 79.0% 
Lang_German 13.2% 11.1% 9.7% 11.4% 
Non-economist 2.6% 11.1% 0.0% 5.8% 
 
#
 In Session 2, 36 observations correspond to 18 players 1, each matched with two players 2. 
## Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses) 
###
 (number of observations × y) 
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Table 2:   Altruism Regressions, OLS 
(independent variable = si) # 
 
 (I) (II) ## (III) (IV) ### 
yj 
0.02 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
0.02  
(0.46) 
-0.27 
(-0.22) 
Female   -0.62 (-0.76) 
-0.27 
(-0.22) 
Female × yj    -0.03 (-0.30) 
Nat_Swiss   0.12 (0.11) 
-0.64 
(-0.45) 
Nat_Swiss × yj    0.08 (0.66) 
Lang_French   -0.07 (-0.06) 
1.05 
(0.54) 
Lang_French × yj    -0.13 (-1.00) 
Lang_German   1.34 (0.85) 
3.28 
(1.48) 
Lang_German × yj 
   -0.19 
(-1.23) 
Non-economist   3.66 (4.48) *** 
3.34 
(2.72) *** 
Non-economist × yj 
   0.04 
(0.43) 
Session_B   -1.47 (-1.88) * 
-1.92 
(-1.55) 
Session_B × yj    0.04 (0.38) 
Session_C   -0.83 (-0.90) 
-1.42 
(-1.02) 
Session_C × yj    0.06 (0.56) 
Dummies for 1st-movers no yes no no 
Constant 6.83 (13.71)*** 
4.83 
(3.71) *** 
8.73 
(5.45) *** 
10.56 
(5.45) *** 
R-squared 0.003 0.64 0.09 0.11 
F statistic (full model) 0.27 133.34 *** 3.56 *** 3.70 *** 
Breusch-Pagan test #### 0.91 0.005 0.11 0.07 
RESET test ##### 0.23 0.94 0.92 0.64 
Observations 105 36 105 105 
 
#
 White-corrected t statistics in brackets; *: 90% confidence level, **: 95% , ***: 99% 
##
 Regression includes only observations from Session B. 
###
 F statistic (P value) on H0 that interaction terms are jointly zero: all 7 variables: 0.42 (0.89), 2 
language variables: 0.78 (0.46), 2 session variables: 0.17 (0.84) 
####
 P value of chi-square test of constant error variance 
#####
 P value of F test of statistical significance of powers of fitted values (H0: correct functional form, 
no omitted variables) 
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Table 3:   Altruism Regressions, Tobit 
(independent variable = si) # 
 
 (I) (II) ## (III)  (IV) ### 
yj 
0.06 
(0.61) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.05  
(0.57) 
-0.38 
(-0.77) 
Female   -1.68 (-0.91) 
-0.92 
(-0.38) 
Female × yj    -0.07 (-0.34) 
Nat_Swiss   0.46 (0.18) 
-1.37 
(-0.38) 
Nat_Swiss × yj    0.18 (0.67) 
Lang_French   -0.12 (-0.04) 
2.15 
(0.47) 
Lang_French × yj    -0.27 (-0.68) 
Lang_German   3.80 (0.93) 
8.60 
(1.39) 
Lang_German × yj 
   -0.45 
(-1.09) 
Non-economist   2.01 (2.03) ** 
6.27 
(1.27) 
Non-economist × yj 
   2.03 
(n.a.) #### 
Session_B   -2.75 (-1.56) 
-3.71 
(-1.38) 
Session_B × yj    0.06 (0.30) 
Session_C   -1.10 (-0.50) 
-3.01 
(-0.98) 
Session_C × yj    0.19 (0.80) 
Dummies for 1st-movers no yes no no 
Constant 8.93 (7.21)*** 
4.76 
(1.96) * 
13.34 
(3.42) *** 
18.48 
(5.45) ** 
Pseudo R-squared ##### 0.001 0.28 0.02 0.03 
Observations 105 36 105 105 
 
#
 two-sided Tobit with censoring at si =0 and si = 10; White-corrected t statistics in brackets; 
    
*: 90% confidence level, **: 95%, ***: 99%  
##
 Regression includes only observations from Session B. 
###
 F statistic (P value) on H0 that interaction terms are jointly zero: all 7 variables: 0.33 (0.92), 2 
language variables: 0.43 (0.65), 2 session variables: 0.42 (0.66) 
#### not estimated due to insufficient degrees of freedom 
#####
 = 1 - L1/L0, where L0 and L1 are the constant-only and full model log-likelihoods respectively 
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Table 4:   Reciprocity Regressions, OLS 
(independent variable = si) # 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)  
Observations 
 included if:  si > 0 si > 0, jˆ  si > 0, jˆ  
jˆ
##
 
-0.02 
(-0.06) 
0.17 
(0.47) 
0.72 
(1.79) ** 
0.94 
(2.44) *** 
0.90 
(1.34) * 
1.17 
(1.77) ** 
yj 
 0.01 
(0.37) 
 0.01 
(0.31) 
 0.01 
(0.34) 
Female  -1.12 (-1.73) * 
 -1.20 
(-1.93) * 
 -0.88 
(-1.22) 
Nat_Swiss  0.79 (0.94) 
 0.43 
(0.51) 
 -0.13 
(-0.15) 
Lang_French  -0.37 (-0.41) 
 -0.22 
(-0.23) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
Lang_German  1.21 (1.18) 
 1.37 
(1.30) 
 1.34 
(1.16) 
Non-economist  2.93 (4.17) *** 
 2.73 
(3.99) *** 
 2.96 
(3.79) *** 
Session_B  -0.65 (-0.94) 
 -0.33 
(-0.52) 
 -0.50 
(-0.61) 
Session_C  1.14 (1.68) * 
 1.43 
(2.21) ** 
 1.45 
(1.70) * 
Constant 7.95 (12.38)*** 
7.05 
(6.53) *** 
6.86 
(9.02)*** 
5.93 
(5.46) *** 
6.68 
(6.60)*** 
5.92 
(4.08) *** 
Observations ### 93 93 89 89 69 69 
R-squared 0.0001 0.18 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.11 
F statistic (full model) 0.00 3.75 *** 3.20 * 3.72 *** 1.78 2.80 *** 
Breusch-Pagan test #### 0.95 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.31 0.31 
RESET test ##### 0.12 0.82 0.31 0.57 0.001 0.77 
 
#
 White-corrected t statistics in brackets; *: 90% confidence level, **: 95% confidence level, ***: 99% 
confidence level 
##
 confidence levels with respect to one-tailed t test 
###
 11 observations with si = 0 and one observation with unreported irˆ  were dropped. 
####
 P value of chi-square test of constant error variance 
#####
 P value of F test of statistical significance of powers of fitted values (H0: correct functional form, 
no omitted variables) 
  
 
 
 Figure 1:   First-Mover Transfers and Second-Mover Returns 
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Figure 2:   Expected and Actual Second-Mover Returns 
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